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 absTraCT
A scholarly consensus exists regarding the fact that electoral processes can facili-
tate democratisation but can equally be the source of instability and/or advance authoritarian 
rule. Generally, these processes are analyzed by focussing on macro-political institutions and 
actors. This paper, however, presents a « bottom-up » analysis of the 2010 electoral proces in 
Burundi through the analysis of survey results that are representative for the Burundian elector-
ate. The results reveal the existence of two regional tendencies regarding “political mobilisa-
tion”. In addition, four major “electoral groups” can be identified throughout the Burundian ter-
ritory. Although the “generic” motivation to exercise civic rights and democratic duties through 
elections is widespread throughout these electoral groups and regions, the findings reveal that 
an important part of the electorate is either disinterested or characterized by populistic or clien-
telistic thinking and behaviour. The findings also suggest the existence of a divide between the 
perceived preoccupations of the political class and the aspirations of the ordinary population. 
Situated in the context of twenty years of political transition in Burundi, these “pragmatic” and 
“populistic” practices and local ways of political thinking observed during the 2010 electoral 
process reveal the danger of an instrumentalisation of these tendencies by anti-democratic and/
or violent “forces”. Secondly, it raises the question how to democratize Burundi’s political tran-
sition in substance, thus also in local popular thoughts and practices.
 resume
Il existe un consensus scientifique concernant le fait que les processus élector-
aux peuvent faciliter la démocratisation mais peuvent également être la source d’instabilité ou 
encore amener un régime autoritaire. Généralement, ces processus sont analysés en mettant 
l’accent sur les acteurs et les institutions politiques macros. Cet article présente toutefois une 
analyse par le bas du processus électoral de 2010 au Burundi par le biais de l’analyse des résul-
tats d’un sondage représentatif de l’électorat burundais. Les résultats révèlent l’existence de 
deux tendances régionales sur le plan de la « mobilisation politique ». En plus, quatre grands  « 
groupes d’électeurs » peuvent être distingués au sein du territoire burundais. Bien que la mo-
tivation « générique », c’est-à-dire l’exercice des droits civiques grâce à des élections, soit très 
répandue dans l’ensemble de ces groupes d’électeurs et les diverses régions du pays identifiées, 
les résultats révèlent qu’une partie importante de l’électorat est désintéressée ou alors caracté-
risée par des comportements et des pensées  populistes ou clientélistes. Les résultats indiquent 
également l’existence d’un fossé entre la perception des préoccupations de la classe politique et 
les aspirations de la population ordinaire. Situées dans le contexte de vingt années de transition 
politique au Burundi, ces pratiques « pragmatiques » et « populistes » et les modes de pensée 
politique observés au niveau local durant le processus électoral de 2010 révèlent le danger d’une 
instrumentalisation de ces tendances par des « forces » antidémocratiques et/ou violentes. En 
second lieu, se pose également la question de savoir comment démocratiser en substance la 
transition politique du Burundi, donc aussi dans les pratiques et les pensées populaires locales.
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1. InTroduCTIon1
This paper offers a bottom-up analysis of the process of successive elections in Bu-
rundi between May and September 2010. By taking into account the (often disregarded) per-
spective of the Burundian voter, it attempts to fathom the issues at stake as perceived by citi-
zens and communities, as well as the motivations (political, ideological, material and others) 
determining this particular electoral behaviour. The results of this study should be put within 
the context of macro-political dynamics at national level with regard to the 2010 elections and 
their results (see also section 2).
The research leading to this paper took place between January and December 2010. 
The data was collected during the period of the Burundi 2010 elections.2 Two research strate-
gies were used. The first strategy was a quantitative one by means of two surveys conducted 
among the Burundian population of voting age (18 and up): a first pre-election survey in March 
2010 and a post-election survey in August 2010. In each survey,  2000 interviews were conducted 
across the whole Burundian territory on the basis of a representative cross-section of the Burun-
dian population of voting age. A second strategy was a qualitative one by means of discussion 
groups. The findings arising from these discussions allowed for an illustration of the quantita-
tive results. The methodology is further explained in section 3.
The analysis and the presentation of these results are structured in five sections. 
A first section covers electoral practices in terms of participation in different political meetings, 
thus offering an indicator enabling us to take into account, among other things, affinities with 
various political parties. A second section concerns the knowledge of national and local per-
sonalities in the different political parties. A third section gauges participation in the different 
2010 elections. This new indicator allows us to determine the voting practices of the Burundian 
population. These three sections provide intermediary results that allow us to chart « Burundian 
groups of voters ». This classification into groups of voters constitutes an analysis grid for the 
next sections. A fourth section concerns voter motivation. The fifth section examines the per-
ception of the political parties’ level of concern when it comes to a series of concrete issues in 
view of the electorate’s major concerns. This analysis takes place both at national level and by 
taking into account the different groups of voters.
These sections are structured as follows: first, the data are presented in graphs and 
charts; then, the most relevant findings are highlighted; and lastly, an attempt at interpreting 
the findings is made. However, these interpretations are mostly hypotheses, difficult to con-
firm with 100% certainty, but which nevertheless provide a ”reading” of the elections from the 
bottom-up.
[1]   The authors wish to thank Filip Reyntjens and Eva Palmans who formulated interesting comments on previ-
ous drafts of this paper. We also thank our Burundian research assistants who carried out the fieldwork in Burundi..
[2]  This research was financed by the UK Departement for International Development (DFID) within the frame-
work of funding the NGO La Bénévolencjia for the project « Pool de journalistes ». The primary goal of this research 
was to measure the impact of media productions during the 2010 election process among the Burundian population 
entitled to vote. See also: La Benevolencija, Médias pour une responsabilité citoyenne : utilité, efficacité et impact, 
rapport de recherche, Bujumbura, La Benevolencija, décembre 2010.
10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2011-05 voting practices during the 2010 Burundi elections
2. The 2010 eleCTIons wIThIn The ConTexT of TwenTy years of   
 polITICal TransITIon
It is difficult – even undesirable – to separate local electoral practices and dynam-
ics from their context, not only in Burundi but globally, as elections have become the ultimate 
yardstick for democratic performance in the eyes of donors and other international actors. This 
section starts by placing the recent election process within the turbulent context of Burundian 
political transition over the last twenty years. Subsequently, we shall summarise some issues 
and results of the 2010 elections at the national level. 
2.1  Brief historical overview:  elections and transitions
Before turning our attention to  voter motivation and the voting practices of Bu-
rundians, we situate said voters’ participation in the elections within the political context of the 
(multiple) transitions the country has faced in the last twenty years. Indeed, Burundi was first 
ruled, in the early 1990s, by a single-party authoritarian regime (dominated by a demographic 
minority group). Later on, this system was replaced by a multi-party system with democratic 
aspirations. After the failure of this political transition, Burundi underwent a second transition, 
from an armed internal conflict towards a situation of peace. In this section, we will focus on 
the role of elections within the context of these two transitions. To put it briefly, the Burundian 
experience is a perfect illustration of the more realistic theory concerning the advantages and 
restrictions posed by elections, which, in a « traditional » view, were presented as the ultimate 
instrument of democracy. More recent scientific literature acknowledges that election process-
es may hold out the prospect of democratisation as well as the danger of instability and even the 
return to an authoritarian regime (Lindberg, 2009). 
Since 1990 and the introduction in 1992 of a democratic constitution effecting the 
return to a multi-party system– which Burundi already knew during the first years of indepen-
dence until the replacement of the Kingdom by the Republic in November 1966 – the Burundians 
voted on three occasions: in 1993, 2005 and 2010. 
In 1993, for approximately four months, Burundi was applauded as a worthy ex-
ample of the so-called third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991). The 1993 elections saw 
the rise of the Frodebu party (Front pour la démocratie au Burundi) on the political scene dur-
ing the legislative elections and the presidential election, with its candidate Melchior Ndadaye 
beating incumbent president Pierre Buyoya, who belonged to the Uprona party (Parti de l’unité 
pour le progrès national), which used to be the only political party allowed in the country. Even 
if the result obtained by Frodebu during the legislative elections (72.5%, as opposed to 21.8% 
for Uprona) was not an exact reflection of the demographic composition of society in Burundi 
(supposedly around 85% Hutu and 14% Tutsi), it was difficult not to consider this democratic 
voting process as having followed ethnic lines. In a country ravaged by tragic events in, amongst 
other periods, 1972 and 1988 - that are so radically and divergently perceived by large segments 
of Hutu opinion (see for example Nsanze, 2002) and Tutsi opinion (see for example Rutamucero, 
2007) - it is no wonder that political and electoral competition not only reflects, but even rein-
forces ethnic cleavages (Reilly 2008). When was this visible in Burundi? 
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Firstly, the new Ndadaye government ensured, notably at the highest level of politi-
cal institutions, the allocation of key posts to Tutsis; the president had even appointed a Tutsi 
Prime Minister. By doing so, he went much further than the minimum requirement stipulated by 
the constitution, which was designed to reflect the diverse make-up of the Burundian population 
(«être composé dans un esprit d’unité nationale en tenant compte des diverses composantes de 
la population burundaise», art. 86). Secondly, despite this political inclusion, the country quick-
ly underwent a process of ‘Frodébisation’ at various levels of public administration (Reyntjens, 
2000). For a part of the Tutsi political elite, the electoral defeat posed a threat since it could 
undermine its access to multiple resources hitherto guaranteed by political power: employment, 
credit, education grants, land, business contracts, international aid, etc. Thirdly, one part of the 
Tutsi elite, fearing that the electoral defeat would inevitably lead to the loss of control over pro-
tection devices for demographic minority groups, casted a veto (Sullivan, 2005). During a military 
coup, Ndadaye and other Hutu dignitaries of the Frodebu party were assassinated in October 
1993.
This asssassination led to the most violent episode in the country’s history, with 
the start of a the civil war in June 1994 that would last approximately fifteen years and make 
thousands of victims. In political terms, the institutional vacuum that followed the military coup 
gave rise to the perception, notably on the side of the Hutu, that the election results were being 
renegotiated, if not annihilated altogether. The Kigobe-Novotel agreements and the subsequent 
government convention of 1994 – which focused on cataloguing all posts to be allocated to the 
two big political families – could not ease the ethno-political tensions. This also led to a decon-
struction of the political landscape – a trend which has not halted yet and which accounts for the 
fact that the original Frodebu party has meanwhile given way to at least four other parties which 
are primarily Hutu: CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie), CNDD-FDD (Con-
seil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie), which again 
led to the creation of UPD (Union pour la paix et le développement), and finally Frodebu Nyakuri 
(or ‘real’ Frodebu - Nyakuri).
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed on 28th August 
2000, meant a compromise between the two big political families, a primarily Hutu G7 around 
Frodebu and a primarily Tutsi G10 around Uprona. It also outlined a new Constitution – now with 
a reinforced consociative character with the objective to protect the demographic Tutsi minority. 
An electoral system was put in place to ensure democracy and stability and that departed from 
the majority model that had proven to be unfeasible within the particular Burundian context. 
Contrary to what its title suggested, the Arusha Treaty could not put a stop to an armed conflict 
without the negotiated agreement with the two principal rebel mouvements, CNDD-FDD (treaty 
signed in November 2003) and the Palipehutu-FNL (treaty signed in September 2006, but only 
implemented, after many obstacles, in December 2008). For each of these rebellious parties, the 
elections – and certainly the hope for an election victory – were presented as a carrot by the in-
ternational negotiators with the objective to convince them to transform themselves from armed 
movements to political parties. Altough they did not sign the Arusha Treaty, CNDD-FDD did ac-
cept the regulatory electoral framework that was negotiated. As a result, despite a landslide vic-
tory in 2005, CNDD-FDD was forced to include ministers from the Frodebu and Uprona parties 
in the coalition government. Only a few months after the inauguration of the new government, 
CNDD-FDD found their hands tied by the quota system, corrected proportionalities and qualified 
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majority requirements as stipulated by the Constitution – notably after an internal argument 
among twenty-two deputies over their former Secretary General, Hussein Radjabu (Vandegin-
ste, 2008).
2.2. The 2010 elections: issues and results at the national level
Given this electoral experience within the context of a tumultuous and bloody po-
litical transition, the 2010 elections posed serious challenges. Would these second elections 
after the civil war allow Burundi to move towards enhanced democracy, as part of the scien-
tific literature suggests (Lindberg, 2006)? Would the dominant party’s control over the state, 
including the local administration, the police, and education services, allow for free and regular 
elections? By contrast, would the electoral competition not be at risk of waking ethnic demons 
that had only just been repressed? Would the complex system of consociative power-sharing be 
able to comfort those who lost the elections to the point of making them recognise defeat and 
thus preventing a regression that might put an end to the fragile peace that was attained with 
such great difficulty? What would be the electoral success of the new parties, such as the FNL 
(Forces nationales de libération) of Agathon Rwasa (a party that, just like CNDD-FDD in 2005, 
presented itself as the party of change), the UPD party (of the former CNDD-FDD leading man, 
Hussein Radjabu) and the MSD party (Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie) of Alexis 
Sinduhije?
After an extremely long pre-election campaign, marked by controversy around the 
erection of the national electoral commission – the “Commission électorale nationale indépen-
dante” (CENI) and the new electoral code (adopted in September 2009), as well as violent po-
litical upheavals (Human Rights Watch, 2010), the electoral marathon was finally on its way, 
starting with the communal elections on 24th May. For five months - from May to September 
2010 - five elections at different levels were organised: communal elections (24th May), the pres-
idential election (28th June), legislative elections (23rd July), senate elections (28th July) and 
elections at hill (colline) level (7th September).
Of the 44 recognised political parties, 23 took part in the communal elections. Table 
1 gives an overview of the results obtained by the eight parties that presented their lists of can-
didates in at least 100 of the 129 Burundian communes (municipalities)
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Table 1 - Communal elections
Source: the authors
On the one hand the table clearly shows the electoral triumph of the CNDD-FDD 
party, on the other hand, in comparison with the 2005 communal election results (62.6% of the 
votes), the score obtained by this party is not that surprising. What did change, however – and 
undoubtedly explains in part the reaction of the opposition parties (see below) – were the ex-
pectations of the other parties. 
The results at national level, as indicated by the table, conceal the diversity at re-
gional level. Indeed, CNDD-FDD obtained the highest scores in Karusi and Ngozi, the original 
province of President Nkurunziza. Everywhere else, it obtained an absolute majority of the votes 
with the exception of three provinces (Bujumbura Mairie, Bururi and Bujumbura). Given the fact 
that CNDD-FDD’s political dominance is clearly less absolute in the capital and the adjacent 
province, this might become a destabilising factor for the new regime in the medium term.
In face of the communal election results, twelve opposition parties (including the 
FNL, Frodebu, CNDD, MSD and UPD, but not Uprona, which opted for a strategic position be-
tween CNDD-FDD and the opposition) immediately put in place an ADC-Ikibiri coalition (Alli-
ance des démocrates pour le changement au Burundi3) and claimed massive electoral fraud as 
the cause of these unexpected results. They referred to the general climate of voter intimidation 
(notably after activities led by young CNDD-FDD militants, the imbonerakure (literally: « those 
who see far ahead ») in various provinces in the north of the country, to the poorly observed 
voting secrecy in polling booths that did not guarantee full confidentiality, to the systematic fill-
ing of ballot boxes, to the power cuts while votes were being counted, etc.) (ADC-Ikibiri 2010). 
Despite the fact that national and international observers testified that the election process 
was fair, the ADC-Ikibiri demanded for all the communal election results to be nullified, for the 
electoral commission to be replaced and for a process of political dialogue to be launched, with 
international mediation between CNDD-FDD and the opposition, so as to prepare a new elec-
tion process. 
Mere days into the implementation of this process, it became clear that the strat-
egy of the opposition coalition consisted primarily of questioning the elections’ legitimacy for 
the consumption of outsiders, i.e. Burundi’s major international partners. If they succeeded in 
[3] Parties taking part in this alliance: ADR, CDP, CNDD, FEDS-SANGIRA, FNL, MSD, PARENA, PIT, PPDRR, 
RADEBU, FRODEBU and UPD
Turnout Rates: 90.6%  
Party % of the votes seats
CNDD-FDD 64.03 1203
FNL 14.15 291
UPRONA 6.25 152
FRODEBU 5.43 123
MSD 3.75 92
UPD 2.21 32
FRODEBU NYAKURI 1.36 8
CNDD 1.26 19
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convincing the international community not to support the next phases in the election process, 
everything would be possible and everything would have to be renegotiated. As with the Burun-
dian elections of 1993 and as recent experiences in Kenya and Zimbabwe have shown, it is not 
impossible to renegotiate a bad election result – on the condition that the occurrence of political 
violence can be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Despite the efforts of high-ranking represen-
tatives in the international community, alarmed by the risk of instability that is linked to the 
contestation of communal election results – as well as by the number of grenade explosions in 
many parts of the country – these representatives have not been able to convince the leaders 
of the opposition parties to join the election process, despite the opportunity for some of them, 
namely the FNL and the Frodebu, to take part in the future government on the condition of ob-
taining 5% of the votes in the legislative elections. However, by adopting a strategic decision to 
save the pluralist nature of the elections, the Uprona party decided to take part in the legislative 
elections, despite its boycott of the presidential elections – a boycott which would not have af-
fected this party since it had no chance of winning this election.
The first (and only) presidential election round took place on 28th June after the 
withdrawal of six out of seven of the initial candidates. Voter turnout stood at 76.98% and the 
only candidate, Pierre Nkurunziza, obtained 91.6% of the votes. Quite paradoxically, the nature 
of the popular response to the boycott that was launched by the opposition largely confirmed 
the communal election results. This could be interpreted as an indicator of the accuracy of the 
latter. Indeed, voter turnout was markedly lower in the three provinces where CNDD-FDD had 
not obtained an overall majority during the communal voting.
With the exception of some independent candidates and a few small parties gener-
ally unknown to the larger public, three parties took part in the legislative elections on 23rd July: 
CNDD-FDD, Frodebu Nyakuri – generally acknowledged as an auxiliary party created with the 
active support of CNDD-FDD in order to cause a rift in Léonce Ngendakumana’s Frodebu party 
– and Uprona. As with the presidential election, voter turnout was lower during the legislative 
elections in the aforementioned provinces (Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura and Bururi). Uprona 
as well as Frodebu Nyakuri largely benefitted from their participation and the boycott by other 
parties. Uprona, which effectively doubled its score, was able to send – after co-optation – 17 
deputies to the national Assembly and, having obtained 5% of the votes, was guaranteed a role 
in the coalition government. The same rewards were obtained by Frodebu Nyakuri, led by Jean 
Minani (table 2). 
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Table 2 – National Assembly Elections 
The (indirect) election of senators took place on 28th July. Senators were chosen 
by provincial electoral colleges composed in accordance with the results of the communal elec-
tions. It was not surprising to see CNDD-FDD obtain the overall majority of seats in the sen-
ate (table 3). As with the National Assembly, the composition of the new Senate complies with 
the articles of the Constitution (including ethnic parity and a minimum of 30% participation of 
women).
Table 3 – Senate Elections 
Some conclusions can be made when considering the election process at nation-
al level, from a macro-level perspective (see also : Vandeginste, 2011; see also Palmans, 2011). 
Firstly, the disastrous strategy of the opposition parties is striking. Despite the constitutional 
framework and an electoral system that is particularly favourable to the losing parties (notably 
due to the multiple mechanisms of proportionality), any opposition other than Uprona is cur-
rently completely absent in parliament. Given that the electoral boycott of the parties belonging 
to the ADC-Ikibiri coalition was based on strategic calculations – in order to ‘renegotiate’ the 
election results to ensure their representation within the institutions – it can be described as a 
failure. Secondly, the following question arises : haven’t the Burundians, twenty years after the 
abolition of the single-party regime, actually voted in favour of a return to a single-party struc-
ture? To put it differently, has the political pluralism within the Burundian institutions become 
so insignificant that five years from now, one will have to conclude that the 2010 elections have 
led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime that cannot lose any new elections? Thirdly, 
CNDD-FDD could, legally speaking, unilaterally modify the Constitution, including the ethnic 
balance that is hitherto protecting the demographic Tutsi minority and especially the Tutsi poli-
Voter turnout: 66.68%
Seats (after co-optation)
Party % of the 
votes Hutu Tutsi Twa Total
CNDD-FDD 81.19 54 27 0 81
UPRONA 11.06 5 12 0 17
FRODEBU NYAKURI 5.88 3 2 0 5
Twa 3 3
Total 62 41 3 106
Source: the authors
Seats
Party Hutu Tutsi Twa Total
CNDD-FDD 17 15 0 32
UPRONA 0 2 0 2
Former presidents (life-long senatorship) 2 2 0 4
Twa (co-opted) 3 3
Total 19 19 3 41
Source: the authors
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ticians An aspect that especially the latter consider a safeguard against the demographic Hutu 
majority. Will CNDD-FDD ever go to such lengths? Fourthly, what is the future for those op-
position parties that are currently outside the institutions? Will some of them opt for political 
violence, which could undermine the results of the long and difficult peace process? And, in case 
such a worst-case scenario develops, will the parties involved benefit from the indispensable 
support of the Burundian population?
While these questions concern future politics in Burundi and are more macro-polit-
ical in nature, the process analysed on the following pages took place in the period of the previ-
ous elections and at micro-level, both at the level of the Burundians hills and in the mindset of 
the inhabitants of these hills. The objective, however, is not only to understand what happened 
during that election period at that level, but also to move beyond these insights in order to put 
potential longer-term evolutions in the current political constellation at macro level into per-
spective.
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3.   meThodology
Two strategies have been used to collect the data for this research. The first strategy 
was a quantitative one by means of two surveys conducted among the Burundian population of 
voting age (18 and up). A second strategy was qualitative in nature by means of focus groups. 
The quantitative strategy was realised by means of a «barometer survey» in two stages4: a pre-
election survey, stage 1, in March 20105, and a post-election survey, stage 2, in August 2010. 
During each of these two stages, approximately 2000 face-to-face interviews were conducted 
across the Burundian territory.
The territory was divided in five « provincial zones » (graph 1). These provincial 
zones have been defined according to precise criteria such as geographical proximity, political 
tendencies, returnee areas, the resemblance of conflicts (over land or over ethnic issues…), and 
in line with previously conducted studies by partner organisations.6 The zones are: the Centre, 
with Bujumbura Mairie; the South, with the provinces of Bururi, Rutana, Makamba, Ruyigi; the 
Centre East with the provinces de Mwaro, Muramyva, Gitega, Cankuzo, Karuzi; the North East, 
including the provinces of Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga, Kirundo, and finally the North West with 
the provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura (previously called Bujumbura Rural)7 .
In each survey stage, 400 interviews were conducted in each unit of provinces. The 
samples of the first and the second stage are completely similar as they both represent a cross-
section of the Burundian population of voting age (18 and up) according to the following criteria: 
gender8; age (18 - 25, 26 - 40, 41 and older)9; the type of residential environment (urban / rural)10. 
[4] More information on the selection and training of the interviewers as well as the nature of fieldwork can be 
found in: La Benevolencija, Médias pour une responsabilité citoyenne : utilité, efficacité et impact, rapport de re-
cherche, Bujumbura, La Benevolencija, décembre 2010.
[5] The results presented in this paper are taken from the post-election survey unless indicated otherwise.
[6] The survey’s design was validated by the ISTEEBU (Institut de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques du 
Burundi)
[7] The province of Bujumbura (Mairie) constitutes a separate entity since it includes the capital Bujumbura; 
it therefore has all the characteristics of a capital (higher socio-economic level, 100% urban population,…). The 
provinces of Bururi, Rutana, Makamba and Ruyigi are situated in the south of the country and share the same 
characteristics. These provinces have always been influenced by problems concerning refugees and repatriates. 
Given their location, they have also been influenced by Tanzania. The return of refugees explains the conflicts over 
land in these provinces. The provinces of Mwaro, Muramyva, Gitega, Cankuzo and Karuzi are situated in the central/
eastern region. The province of Gitega (the most densely populated area of Burundi) and Karuzi have suffered many 
casualties during the different Burundi conflicts. The provinces of Karuzi and Cankuzo have been greatly influenced 
by Tanzania. Finally, Mwaro and Muramyva, composed of more conservative Burundians, have not been much 
affected by the recent socio-political crises. The provinces of Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga and Kirundo are situated 
in the north-east of Burundi. Kirundo has always been influenced by the cultural, socio-economic and political 
influences of Rwanda, and to a lesser extent, the same goes for the province of Muyinga. Kayanza and Ngozi are 
characterised by a climate of tension that sometimes erupts in violent confrontations between major political par-
ties. This situation can partly be explained by the fact that the political leaders are all from the north of the country, 
which is clearly illustrated by CNDD-FDD and FNL (Ngozi) and FRODEBU (Kayanza – if we consider Ndayizeye as 
the leader), whereas for Uprona and CNDD this is not the case. For UPD, it is the case if we consider Kampayano 
(Ngozi) or Feruzi (Muyinga) as the leaders; furthermore, the leader Hussein Radjabu also comes from the province of 
Muyinga. Finally, the north-western provinces include Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura. Bubanza and Bujumbura 
have always been the heartland of  rebel movements. The provinces of Cibitoke and Bubanza are also characterised 
by superstitious behaviour (high level of illiteracy, strong preference for traditional healing practices, resorting 
to witchcraft to settle social problems). Moreover, Cibitoke is particularly influenced by Congolese and Rwandan 
cultures.
[8] Source : National Census 2008
[9] Source : Survey QIBB (Questionnaire unifié des indicateurs de base du bien- être) conducted in 2006 and 
financed by the Banque mondiale
[10] The hypothesis of a greater heterogeneity in an urban context justifies its overrepresentation.
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Within each unit of provinces we ensured an equal spread among the different categories11. Dur-
ing the two survey stages, the interviews were classified as indicated by graph 1.
In addition to the barometer survey, the qualitative material, i.e. the findings from 
the Focus Groups organised in Burundi in September 2010 by the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), serve as  illustrations. 12
Graph 1: Sample 
[11] The surveys  were conducted by means of a combination of two methods: one consisting of a purposive selec-
tion at the first level followed by a random method at the second level; and “itineraries” at the third level. This 
makes it possible to extrapolate the results for the entire population or per sampled group as well as to calculate 
errors in terms of variation coefficient or confidence interval. Significant variations were established by comparing 
averages using the t-test. Moreover, the margin of error for this sample size is ± 2.2 points. This means that for the 
total sample, a variation could be considered as significant as of 4.4 points.
[12] In September 2010 the National Democratic Institute conducted 55 focus groups in 10 provinces of Burundi 
(Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura, Bubanza, Bururi, Mwaro, Gitega, Ruyigi, Ngozi, Kirundo and Muyinga). For more 
details about the sample we refer to the report « The road ahead: L’état d’esprit des citoyens du Burundi après les 
élections de 2010 », NDI, February 2011.
20. PARTIE I :  Mesure de l’impact des productions médiatiques et de la Synergie des médias lors des élections de 2010 au Burundi 
u	Réalisation de deux fois près de 2.000 interviews en face à face, à travers tout le territoire 
burundais.
 Le recrutement des enquêteurs de terrain fut fait sur base d’une sélection après une journée de tests 
et a tenu compte de la représentativité ethnique/régionale du pays. Tous les enquêteurs sélectionnés 
(12 lors de la première vague et 12 lors de la seconde (dont la plupart avaient participé avec succès à la 
première vague et étaient disponibles) sont universitaires, de nationalité burundaise, bilingues (Kirundi / 
Français) et ont déjà réalisé des enquêtes.
 La formation des enquêteurs s’est étalée sur deux jours. D’abord, formation à la technique 
d’enquête (notions générales, attitudes et comportements à adopter etc…) puis formation spécifique 
pour cette recherche : lecture et compréhension approfondie du questionnaire en français puis 
vérification collective de la traduction en Kirundi. Ensuite, test sur le terrain et débriefing.
 Les enquêteurs ont été envoyés sur le terrain en deux équipes de 6, dirigée chacune par un superviseur 
porteur et garant de la "feuille de route" c’est à dire du nombre d’enquêtes par profil (genre et âge) à 
réaliser dans chaque commune. 
 Le Ministère de l’Intérieur a donné officiellement l’autorisation d’intervenir sur le territoire pour réaliser 
ces enquêtes.
DESCRIPTION DES ÉCHANTILLONS INTERVIEWÉS
u	Le territoire fut constitué en cinq "ensembles" ou "Zones de provinces”.
 Les “zones de provinces”  ont été définies selon des critères précis : proximité géographique, tendances 
politiques, zones de rapatriés, ressemblances au niveau des conflits (fonciers, ethniques,...) ..., conformément 
aux études menées antérieurement par des organisations partenaires. 
 Il s’agit des "ensembles" suivants : 
•	 Ensemble / Zone 1 : Centre : Bujumbura mairie
•	 Ensemble / Zone 2 : Sud : Bururi, Rutana, Makamba, Ruyigi
• Ensemble / Zone 3 : Centre/Ouest : Mwaro, Muramyva, Gitega, Cankuzo, Karuzi
•	 Ensemble / Zone 4 : Nord/Ouest : Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga, Kirundo
•	 Ensemble / Zone 5 : Nord/Est : Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura rural
 Au cours de chaque vague 400 interviews ont été réalisées dans chaque "ensemble de provinces".
u	Les échantillons de la première vague du baromètre et de la seconde vague sont totalement 
similaires.  Ils approchent chacun une représentativité de la population burundaise en âge de voter (à partir 
de 18 a s) selon les critères suivants : 
•	 le genre (so ce : Recensement national de 2008),
•	 l’âge	(18	-	25	ans,	26	-	40	ans,	41	ans	et	plus),	(Source	:	étude	QIBS)
•	 le	type	de	milieu	de	résidence	(urbain	/	rural).	L’hypothèse	d’une	plus	forte	hétérogénéité	en	milieu	urbain	
justifie sa sur représentation. 
 A l’intérieur de chaque "ensemble de provinces", nous avons veillé à une répartition équilibrée de ces 
différentes catégories. Un plan de sondage fut validé par l’ISTEEBU (Institut de Statistiques et des Etudes 
Economiques du Burundi Voir Annexe 1 
 Lors des deux vagues d'enquêtes, les interviews furent réparties comme suit :
•	18	to	25	years
•	26	to	40	years
•	41	years	and	over
33%
39%
28%
AGE
•	Women
•	Men
50%
50%
GENDER
Group  1 :  Center / Bujumbura
Group  2 :  South
Group  3 :  Center	/	West
Group  4 :  North	/	West
Group  5 :  North / East
20%
20%
20%
GROUP  (of provinces)
20%
20%
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4. presenCe aT polITICal meeTIngs
Forty-nine percent (49%) of the population says to have attended at least one po-
litical meeting during the election process (graph 2). This indicates, if not a certain interest in the 
election process, at least a curiosity regarding the elections, and certainly the appeal of these 
popular gatherings. Thus, despite the diversity concerning political mobilisation across differ-
ent parties, the electoral campaign was massively followed by the population (ICG, 2011). 
Graph 2 : Presence at political meetings 13
The most frequently visited meetings were those of CNDD-FDD. 36% of the popu-
lation stated having attended at least one meeting of this political party, 15% went to at least 
one meeting of FNL, 9% went to at least one meeting of MSD or Uprona. It has, however, been 
observed that there was a disparity between the resources used by the political parties during 
the electoral campaign; CNDD-FDD disposed of better logistics and promotional means than 
the opposition (organisation of big rallies, distribution of t-shirts, caps, drinks and transport of 
people towards the meeting grounds). The lack of public funding for campaigning has prevented 
the majority of parties from coming up with a considerable election campaign (UE, 2010).
The Burundians mostly (31% of the population) went to the meeting of only one 
political party. This trend was more prevalent among those attending a CNDD-FDD meeting 
(54%) than among those attending an FNL meeting (23%). The latter public was more likely 
than average to attend meetings of other parties as well. This observation confirms a stronger 
CNDD-FDD presence in the field and, potentially, a more indecisive attitude among other voters. 
The new political forces, MSD and UPD, have mobilised fewer people outside their respective 
[13] The arrows indicate the significant variations of the results by age, gender, the set of provinces, the type of 
residential surroundings, the participation in political meetings or elections. For example, in graph 2, among the 
total sample population, 31% of the people went to the meeting of one political party. However, for those who went 
to a CNDD-FDD meeting, the participation rate was higher at 54% and lower for those attending an FNL meeting, at 
23%.
26. PARTIE I :  Mesure de l’impact des productions médiatiques et de la Synergie des médias lors des élections de 2010 au Burundi 
4.  Les pratiques de La popuLation Burundaise, 
 en âge de voter, en période éLectoraLe
Dans cette partie, il est décrit les pratiques de la population Burundaise (en âge de voter). 
Ces données permettront de voir dans la suite de l’analyse si ces différentes pratiques ont de l’influence sur l’impact 
des productions médiatiques. 
PRÉSENCE AUX MEETINGS POLITIQUES
Près	de	50%	de	la	population	dit	avoir	
été à au moins un meeting politique, 
cela indique un certain intérêt pour 
le processus électoral ou du moins 
une certaine curiosité à l’égard des 
élections.  Les meeting les plus 
fréquentés furent, de loin, ceux du 
CNDD-FDD,	36%	de	la	population	
disent avoir été à au moins un meeting 
de	ce	parti	politique.	15%	sont	allés	à	
au moins un meeting du FNL.
Le plus souvent, (31% de l'ensemble 
de la population) les burundais sont 
allés au meeting politique d’un seul 
parti politique. Cette tendance est 
beaucoup plus fréquente parmi ceux 
qui	sont	allés	à	un	meeting	du	CNDD-
FDD	(54%)	que	parmi	ceux	qui	sont	allés	à	un	meeting	du	FNL	(23%).	Ceux-ci	ont	plus	souvent	fréquenté	des	
meetings de plusieurs partis différents. 
Cela	peut	indiquer	une	présence	moins	forte	des	partis	autres	que	les	CNDD-FDD	sur	le	terrain	et	peut-être	un	
sentiment plus indécis pour les autres électorats. 
w Did you attend a political meeting during this electoral 
period  ((April - July 2010) ?
 Base = 100% : total sample.
Yes
49%
No
51%
w What political parties ?  
Open question
 Base = 100% : total sample.
	 1.	 CNDD-FDD	
 2. FNL 
 3. UPRONA
 . MSD
	 5.	 UPD
 6. FRODEBU Sahwanya
 7. CNDD
 8. ADR
 . FRODEBU Nyakuri
 . RADEBU
36%
15%
9%
9%
8%
7%
3%
1%
1%
1%
Total > 49% 
because several 
possible answers.
…of only one 
political party
31%
…of two different 
political parties
6%
…of more than two 
political parties
12%
Attended a political 
meeting  …
 +  Meeting 
  CNDD-FDD 54%
 –  Meeting FNL 23%
 +  Meeting FNL 20%
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heartlands. With respect to the more traditional political forces, Uprona was not able to orga-
nise great rallies, even though it disposes of a national stonghold. Frodebu is no longer what it 
used to be under the leadership of Melchior Ndadaye (ICG, 2011).
Apart from an analysis of the results for the whole of the Burundian population, 
we also include the regional aspect in our analysis. In the wake of the communal election re-
sults of 24th May 2010, two trends in voting at the provincial level could be identified: a single-
party trend in one zone, and a pluralist trend in two other zones. The single-party trend is 
prevalent in the provinces where CNDD-FDD had an overall majority of 78% during the com-
munal elections, namely the provinces of Karusi with 86% of the votes, Ngozi with 81% and 
Ruyigi with 79%. 
The first zone with a pluralist trend is composed of Bujumbura Mairie (the capi-
tal). It is the province that showed the most disparity at the level of communal election results. 
Four political parties (CNDD-FDD, FNL, MSD, Uprona) obtained results varying between 12% 
and 28% (CNDD-FDD keeps the lead). The second zone showing a pluralist trend is composed 
of Bujumbura and constitutes the only province where CNDD-FDD was not the first party dur-
ing the communal elections, but FNL with 57% of the votes against 27% for CNDD-FDD. This 
pluralist zone also comprises the province of Bururi, a second province with diverging results: 
four political parties oscillated between 13% and 26%: CNDD-FDD, Frodebu, FNL and Uprona 
(CNDD-FDD keeps the lead, but Frodebu is the runner-up with only 2% difference). Outside 
these three zones lay the other provinces14 where CNDD-FDD was leading in the communal 
elections with results oscillating between 53% and 77%, depending on the province. 
Ten percent (10%) of the respondents was present at the meeting of one or more 
parties that, after the communal elections, formed the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri. These 
voters did not attend a CNDD-FDD, Uprona or Frodebu Nyakuri meeting. 
Nineteen percent (19%) of the respondents said they exclusively attended one 
or more CNDD-FDD meetings and no meetings of other political parties. In the provinces of 
Bujumbura Mairie and Bururi/Bujumbura, this percentage is somewhat lower (14% and 16%). 
By contrast, in provinces where CNDD-FDD obtained the highest scores in the communal 
elections, 24% only attended CNDD-FDD meetings. Only 2% of the population exclusively at-
tended the meetings of Uprona. Finally, 18% attended political meetings, but not exclusively 
of one particular political party. So these were individuals who did not exclusively attend one 
or more CNDD-FDD meetings, one or more meetings of the coalition ADC-IKIBIRI, or one or 
more Uprona meetings . 
One thus observes a correlation between the kind of participation in political 
meetings and the communal election results in terms of regional divergences. The trends in 
the zones (single-party-oriented or pluralist) at the level of communal election results are also 
reflected in the way the population took part in the political meetings.
[14] The other provinces are Cibitoke, Bubanza, Kayanza, Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega, Muramvyia, Mwaro, 
Makamba, Rutana, and Cankuzo.
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5. Knowledge of naTIonal and loCal personalITIes wIThIn The   
 polITICal parTIes
Generally speaking, the name of the national representative of the political par-
ties mentioned by the individuals was well-known, especially when it comes to  the major op-
position parties. The leaders’ names of the latter parties are mentioned much more often than 
those of the others (table 4). For the party in power (CNDD-FDD), among the individuals who 
mentioned this political party when asked « Which political parties do you know by name»15 (that is 
99%), 37% confirmed that Pierre Nkurunziza is the national representative and 25% mentioned 
Jérémie Ngendakumana. For l’ADC-Ikibiri, which is not a political party, but a coalition of op-
position parties formed after the communal elections, it is striking to see that, despite the fact 
that the names of those in charge of this coalition were only vaguely known during the election 
period (with individuals such as Léonard Nyangoma, Léonce Ngendakumana, Agathon Rwasa 
and Alexis Sinduhije), Agathon Rwasa (37%) was regarded as the national representative of this 
« movement », even though he fled from the country in 2010.
Near the end of the electoral marathon (August 2010), the local representatives 
were barely known. Indeed, in general terms, more than 50% of the population admitted not 
knowing the name of a single local representative. These numbers confirm the idea that the 
communal elections had a very national character. People clearly voted for an emblematic lead-
er at the national level rather than for a candidate at local level. 
« As far as I’m concerned, I do not look at CNDD-FDD as a party, I look at individuals instead. I believe that 
CNDD-FDD won the elections because it had presented Pierre NKURUNZIZA as a presidential candidate»16
The campaign for the communal elections was led by the national political per-
sonalities who were also potential candidates for the presidential election and around national 
themes: this election did not revolve around local development programmes (Vandeginste, 
2011). The communal elections can therefore be considered as a first round of the presidential 
election.
[15] « Quels sont les partis politiques que vous connaissez ne fut-ce que de nom ? »
[16] “De mon côté, je pense que je ne regarde pas le CNDD-FDD en tant que parti, je regarde l’individu. C’est-à-dire 
que le CNDD-FDD a gagné les élections parce qu’il avait présenté Pierre NKURUNZIZA comme candidat à la prési-
dence »  NDI, Focus Group, hommes, province of Muyinga, 30/09/2010.
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Table 4 – Knowledge of national and local personalities
Political Parties Names of national representatives Knowledge of a local  representative
Yes No 
CNDD-FDD
(mentioned by 
99%)
No idea 36 % 5 % 31 %
Pierre Nkurunziza 37 % 18 % 19 %
Jérémie Ngendakumana 25 % 18 % 7 %
Autres 2 %
Frodebu
(mentioned by 
15%)
No idea 47 % 3 % 44 %
Domitien Ndayizeye 23 % 8 % 15 %
Léonce Ndengakumana 16 % 5 % 11 %
Minani Jean 6 % 0 % 6 %
Nyangoma Léonard 3 % 1 % 2 %
Autres 5%
CNDD
(mentioned by 
7%)
No idea 18 % 2 % 16 %
Nyangoma Leonard 71 % 8 % 63 %
Pierre Nkurunziza 4 % 3 % 1 %
Autres 7 %
Uprona 
(mentioned by 
33%)
No idea 55 % 6 % 48 %
Niyoyankana Bonaventure 20 % 8 % 12 %
Sahinguyu Yves 14 % 5 % 9 %
Buyoya Pierre 4 % 0 % 4 %
Louis Rwagasore 2 % 0 % 2 %
Rwasa Agathon 2 % 1 % 1 %
Autres 3 %
FNL
(mentioned by 
30%)
No idea 16 % 3 % 13 %
Rwasa Agathon 76 % 29 % 47 %
Miburo Emmanuel 2 % 1 % 1 %
Sinduhije Alexis 2 % 1 % 1 %
Autres 4 %
MSD 
(mentioned by 
11%)
No idea 6 % 1 % 5 %
Sinduhije Alexis 87 % 50 % 37 %
Rwasa Agathon 2 % 0 % 2 %
Autres 5 %
UPD 
(mentioned by 
9%)
No idea 39 % 3 % 36 %
Feruzi Zedi 29 % 21 % 8 %
Kampayano Pascaline 13 % 4 % 9 %
Mugwengezo Chauvineau 9 % 2 % 7 %
Radjabu Hussein 5 % 2 % 3 %
Autres 5 %
ADC-AKIBIRI 
(mentioned by 
3%)
No idea 32 % 0 % 32 %
Rwasa Agathon 37 % 1 % 36 %
Nyangoma Leonard 22 % 2 % 20 %
Autres 9 %
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6. parTICIpaTIon In The dIfferenT eleCTIons
According to the survey results, voter turnout in the communal elections was very 
high (86%) and it markedly dropped in the later elections: the presidential election and the leg-
islative elections (graph 3). This can be explained by the boycott of the election process after the 
communal elections by several opposition parties that formed the ADC-Ikibiri alliance. Within 
this context, the six major opposition candidates withdrew from the presidential election leav-
ing the incumbent President, Pierre Nkurunziza, as the only candidate.
However, voter turnout in the presidential and legislative elections remained rather 
high (68%). Generally speaking, those who attended (any) political meeting(s) were more likely 
to have voted in the communal elections. Participation in these first meetings reveals a keen 
interest in the election process. The communal elections, as the first in a row of elections, were a 
sort of election poll in a country where the use of election polls is rare. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, in the mindset of many voters, the communal elections were a kind of « first round 
» for the presidential election. 
Graph 3 : Participation in different 2010 elections  
While 86% of the interviewed people said they voted in the communal elections, 
voter turnout was even higher among those who only attended CNDD-FDD meetings (98%) and 
those who only attended the meetings of a party in the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri (96%). 
Concerning the presidential election, 68% of the interviewed people said they voted in this elec-
tion. This voter turnout is much higher among those who only attended CNDD-FDD meetings 
(97%) and logically much lower among those who only attended meetings of a party in the op-
position coalition ADC-Ikibiri (21%). 
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PARTICIPATION AUX DIFFÉRENTES ÉLECTIONS DE 2010
Comme on le sait, le taux de participation aux élections a décru après les élections communales. Néanmoins, les 
différents taux de participation restent élevés et montrent un certain intérêt de la population à l’égard de son 
devoir de citoy .
Tendanciellement, ceux qui ont été à un meeting politique sont plus nombreux à avoir voté aux élections 
communales. Ce qui indique un certain engouement suite aux premiers meetings du processus électoral. Les 
élections communales représentaient un enjeu plus grand, étant le premier scrutin. 
Les taux de participation aux élections Présidentielles et Législatives apparaissent moins élevés dans la province de 
Bujumbura Mairie. 
voted during 
MunicipaL eLections 
of May 24, 2010
No
14%
Yes
86%
98% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
98% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusif
96% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
96% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusif
voted during the 
presidentiaL eLections 
of June 28, 2010
No
32%
Yes
68%
voted during 
LegisLative eLections 
of JuLy 23, 2010
No
32%
Yes
68%
64% des burundais (en âge de voter) disent avoir voté aux trois scrutins. Et, ceux qui ont été à un meeting du 
CNDD-FDD	sont	83%	dans	ce	cas	!	
Ceux qui ont été à un meeting du parti MSD, du parti FNL sont plus nombreux à ne pas avoir voté après les 
élections communales, comme par ailleurs, les personnes de Bujumbura Mairie. Ceci pourrait s’expliquer par le 
refus des militants des partis politiques dits de "l’opposition" à poursuivre le processus électoral suite à l’appel de 
leur leader.
Et, ceux qui ont été à un meeting politique (quel qu'il soit) sont moins nombreux à n’avoir voté à aucune élection. 
Voted during all 
elections
(N = 1.273) 
Voted during Municipal 
Elections but did not vote 
during Presidential and / 
or Legislative elections
(N = 443) 
Did note vote
(N	=	253)	
41% + Zone Center / Buja
 +  Meeting MSD 61%
 +  Meeting FNL 37%
Voted during 
Presidential Elections 
or during Legislative 
elections but not during 
Municipal Elections
3% – Political meeting
64%
13%
1%
22%
97% + Me ting CND -FD  exclusive
94% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
21% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
25% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
93% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
20% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
72% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
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Voter turnout in the presidential and legislative elections appeared to be lower in 
the province of Bujumbura Mairie, which is not surprising since the population in this province 
often attended meetings of an opposition coalition party. People from the provinces of Bururi/
Bujumbura and Bujumbura Mairie were less likely to have voted in these elections (60% and 
52% respectively) than those who came from provinces where CNDD-FDD reached an important 
score during the communal elections (76%).
Moreover, while 68% of the interviewed people stated having voted in the legisla-
tive elections, voter turnout was much higher among those who exclusively attended CNDD-
FDD meetings (94%) and markedly lower among those who only attended meetings of a party 
in the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri (25%). As with the presidential elections, people from 
the province of Bujumbura Mairie were less likely to have voted in the legislative election (56%) 
than those who came from provinces where CNDD-FDD reached an important score during the 
communal elections (72%).
Sixty-four percent (64%) of the Burundians of voting age said they voted in all three 
elections (graph 4). Of those who attended a CNDD-FDD meeting, 83% voted in all three elec-
tions and this percentage is 93% in the group of people who exclusively went to CNDD-FDD 
meetings. Among those who exclusively attended an ADC-Ikibiri meeting, only 20% actually 
voted in all elections (i.e. 2% of the whole population). These are voters who decided to use their 
civil right to vote, despite the call of the opposition parties to abstain from voting, to boycott the 
process. 
We should note, however, that some voters may have decided to still participate in 
the election process because they were intimidated. According to international observers, the 
period leading up to the presidential campaign was characterised by violence causing casualties 
and  people being injured (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The representatives of civil society, po-
litical parties and the population denounced this climate of intimidation that targeted members 
of the opposition parties. People were forced to abandon their party and to join CNDD-FDD. Fur-
thermore, new recruits were invited to testify publicly why they had rightfully abandoned their 
old opposition party in order to encourage the opposion parties’ militants to vote for the only 
presidential candidate (UE, 2010). Intimidating messages were also communicated through 
pamphlets with incendiary content. It should therefore be clear that CNDD-FDD devised mech-
anisms to incite voters of the opposition to vote for them.
.
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Graph 4 : The impact of the « boycott » 
As to the variations in election participation across the provinces, we see that 
people coming from the provinces where CNDD-FDD obtained a large majority during the com-
munal elections were more likely to have voted in all three elections (70%) than those coming 
from provinces with more political diversity, such as Bujumbura/Bururi and Bujumbura Mairie, 
where respectively 58% and 49% of the people voted in all three elections.
These findings confirm voter turnout rates that were released by the Commission 
électorale nationale indépendante (CENI): 91% in the communal elections, 77% in the presidential 
elections and 67% in the legislative elections. The sample in this study can therefore be consid-
ered as a representative cross-section of the Burundian electorate. For such a sample, the ac-
cepted margin of error is +/- 2.2, with an accepted deviation of 4 to 5 points. For the communal 
elections, we observe a deviation of 5 points; for the legislative elections a deviation of 1 point; 
and for the presidential election a deviation of 9 points.17
Although generally speaking, 22% of the people did not vote again after having 
voted during the communal elections, the boycott against the presidential and/or legislative 
elections was far more widespread among residents of Bujumbuara Mairie (41%), among those 
who attended a meeting of the MSD party and/or the FNL party, and even more widespread 
among those who had exclusively attended a meeting of ADC-Ikibiri (72%). This can be ex-
plained by the refusal of the political opposition parties’ militants to continue the election 
process after being called upon to do so by their leader. In addition, people coming from the 
provinces dominated by CNDD-FDD were less likely to have taken part in the boycott (13%) 
than those in the provinces with higher political diversity (Bujumbura/Bururi and Bujumbura 
Mairie).
Moreover, those who attended a political meeting (irrespective of the political 
party) were not likely to abstain from voting in all three elections (3%). This may indicate a 
certain commitment in the process among people who attend meetings.
[17]  An explanation can be that the CENI might have attempted to inflate the figures since the problem of politi-
cal tensions posed the risk of low voter turnout.
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PARTICIPATION AUX DIFFÉRENTES ÉLECTIONS DE 2010
Comme on le sait, le taux de participation aux élections a décru après les élections communales. Néanmoins, les 
différents taux de participation restent élevés et montrent un certain intérêt de la population à l’égard de son 
devoir de citoyen.
Tendanciellement, ceux qui ont été à un meeting politique sont plus nombreux à avoir voté aux élections 
communales. Ce qui indique un certain engouement suite aux premiers meetings du processus électoral. Les 
élections communales représentaient un enjeu plus grand, étant le premier scrutin. 
Les taux de participation aux élections Présidentielles et Législatives apparaissent moins élevés dans la province de 
Bujumbura Mairie. 
voted during 
MunicipaL eLections 
of May 24, 2010
No
14%
Yes
86%
98% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
98% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusif
96% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
96% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusif
voted during the 
presidentiaL eLections 
of June 28, 2010
No
32%
Yes
68%
voted during 
LegisLative eLections 
of JuLy 23, 2010
No
32%
Yes
68%
64% des burundais (en âge de voter) disent avoir voté aux trois scrutins. Et, ceux qui ont été à un meeting du 
CNDD-FDD	sont	83%	dans	ce	cas	!	
Ceux qui ont été à un meeting du parti MSD, du parti FNL sont plus nombreux à ne pas avoir voté après les 
élections communales, comme par ailleurs, les personnes de Bujumbura Mairie. Ceci pourrait s’expliquer par le 
refus des militants des partis politiques dits de "l’opposition" à poursuivre le processus électoral suite à l’appel de 
leur leader.
Et, ceux qui ont été à un meeting politique (quel qu'il soit) sont moins nombreux à n’avoir voté à aucune élection. 
Voted during all 
elections
(N = 1.273) 
Voted during Municipal 
Elections but did not vote 
during Presidential and / 
or Legislative elections
(N = 443) 
Did note vote
(N	=	253)	
41% + Zone Center / Buja
 +  Meeting MSD 61%
 +  Meeting FNL 37%
Voted during 
Presidential Elections 
or during Legislative 
elections but not during 
Municipal Elections
3% – Political meeting
64%
13%
1%
22%
97% + Me ting CND -FD  exclusive
94% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
21% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
25% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
93% + Meeting CNDD-FDD  exclusive
20% – Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
72% + Meeting ADC-IKIBIRI  exclusive
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7. VoTer moTIVaTIon and popular ThInKIng durIng The eleCTIon perIod
The different voting practices during the election process discussed in the previ-
ous sections are intermediary results. Following the analysis of these preliminary results, it is 
relevant to group certain findings together in order to create segments within the Burundian 
electorate. This classification into “groups of voters” provides an analytical framework to struc-
ture the data. We shall thus attempt to determine whether voter motivation differs across dif-
ferent groups, whether the preoccupations of different groups of voters are different, and how 
these groups position themselves with regard to the intimidations and manipulations of various 
political actors.
7.1. The “groups of voters”
The first group is called « The CNDD-FDD voters» (N = 329 = 17%18). When asked: 
«Which political party do you know? », they spontaneously mentioned CNDD-FDD. They exclu-
sively attended CNDD-FDD meetings and they voted in all elections: communal elections, the 
presidential election and the legislative elections19. These responses and pratices suggest that 
these individuals support CNDD-FDD.  They tend to have a rural background. This category of 
voters is primarily composed of peasants and cattle breeders but also civil servants. Only a small 
segment of this categorie is constitued by housewives/ family aides and students. This voter 
group is also less likely to live in Bujumbura Mairie.
Similar indicators have been used to identify another group of voters that was la-
belled « The voters of the opposition » (N = 121 = 6%20). When asked: « Which political party do 
you know? », they spontaneously mentioned a party which is part of the opposition coalition 
ADC-Ikibiri; they only attended meetings of parties belonging to this opposition coalition and 
they voted in the communal elections, but not in the presidential and/or legislative elections 
(which were boycotted by the ADC-Ikibiri).21 These voters usually belong to a higher socio-eco-
nomic class in comparison with the rest of the population. Indeed, it is less likely that these per-
sons never went to school (or only attended primary school). They are less likely to be peasants/
cattle breeders, and more likely to be students and unemployed people. These opposition voters 
mostly come from the capital, Bujumbura Mairie and the province of Bujumbura. Moreover, they 
are not likely to be elderly people (41 years or older).
A third group of voters are the « undecided voters » (N=359 = 18%22). They have at-
tended at least two meetings of different political parties thus they did not exclusively attend 
CNDD-FDD, ADC-Ikibiri or Uprona meetings. Moreover, they voted in at least one of the elec-
tions that were held in 2010. Sixty-nine percent (69%) of them voted in all elections and 30% 
voted in the communal election but abstained from voting in the presidential and/or legislative 
elections (and 1% never voted in any election). These undecided voters are more often young-
sters (between 18 and 25) and they are more likely to be characterised by limited levels of formal 
education.
[18] Base = total sample.
[19] We did not take the senate elections into account as they were indirect. In addition, also the colline (hill) elec-
tions were not considered since theytook place at colline level, where political parties are “officially” excluded. In 
fact, candidates for the colline elections - the positions of hill or neighborhood counsellor -   are not based on politi-
cal party lists. All candidates stand independently without any political party affiliation (UE 2010).
[20] Base = total sample.
[21] The Uprona party is not part of the ADC-IKIBIRI coalition. The group that voted « opposition » therefore does 
not include those who voted for Uprona.
[22] Base = total sample.
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Finally, there is the group we refer to as the «immobile »23 (N=1004 =51%24). These 
are individuals that did not take part in any political meeting. Among them, 61% voted in every 
election, 16% voted in the communal elections but abstained in the other elections, and 23% 
never voted in any election. The latter type of voter, who did not attend any political meeting 
and did not vote in any election, represents 11.7% of the population, i.e. approximately 450,000 
voters; we can consider them as « outsiders » in the election process.25 These “immobile” voters 
tend to be older with little or no schooling. They include peasants and cattle breeders as well as 
retired people and disabled persons.
7.2. Generic motivation and indifference
Generally speaking, a « generic » motivation spontaneously dominated popular 
thinking during and about the election process: voting is a civic duty and the exercise of a right 
- the right to choose one’s leader (table 5). This motivation reflects the official discourse com-
municated by the media, political parties and civil society in general. However, the motivations 
linked to very precise campaign themes were seldom mentioned spontaneously (peace, secu-
rity, justice, the fight against corruption and unemployment, children’s future). Finally, with re-
sults ranging from 3% to 9%26 across different groups of voters, we see a degree of ritual support 
along ethnic and religious lines rather than along party lines.
The perception regarding the primary use of elections (« What is the purpose of 
elections? ») corresponds to the dominant motivation that makes people vote: the elections al-
low people to choose the political party with the best programme, to voice opinion, to reform the 
institutions… The idea of a democratic vote is discernable in the results but the idea that elec-
tions lead to development is not widespread. It seems that the political parties’ programmes 
have not been convincing as « visions », as clear projects for development. 
« The problem of the Burundians is that they do not yet know what voting really means. They do not elect a person for his 
good projects, but just for being that person »27
The generic motivation is logically weaker among the ”immobile” voters (23% of 
which never voted in any election). For these voters, the reasons for not voting (other than per-
sonal reasons) are mostly a feeling of lost confidence, of disappointment with the political es-
tablishment (23%) or simply the feeling that elections lead to nothing (13%).
[23] We use the term “immobile” since they are characterized by limited physical participation in political gather-
ings and do not seem to be moved by the idea of politics and elections.
[24] Base = total sample.
[25] Based upon figures of the latest census in 2008, when there was a potential of 3,819,120 voters.
[26] We should note that these results originate from an open question.
[27]  « Le problème des Burundais c’est qu’ils ne savent pas encore ce que signifie voter. Ils n’élisent pas quelqu’un 
pour ses bons projets mais ils élisent juste l’individu comme ça ». NDI, Focus Group, women, province of Bujumbura 
Mairie, Kinama, 21/09/2010.
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Tableau 5: Voting motivation 
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Tableau 6. Practices and popular thinking in the margins of the elections
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Moreover, among the voters of the opposition, the motivation to vote lies with the 
desire to bring about change. While the CNDD-FDD voters largely support a continuation pro-
cess, the opposition voters tend to follow their political leaders in claiming that the elections 
were manipulated; hence their withdrawal from the election process (87%). This indicates a 
strong grassroot support for their leaders, as well as a certain pressure that is linked to certain 
acts of intimidation that specifically took place before the presidential election (IFES, 2010). The 
opposition voters are characterised by a strong call for replacing the current government lead-
ers (46%). Their absence during the presidential election and the legislative election in the af-
termath of the communal elections thus reflects a punctual mistrust instead of questioning the 
very concept of elections itself.
 The people belonging to the undecided group of voters often spontaneously ex-
press that their motivation to vote is characterized by the support of the party which takes care 
of their preoccupations. This may explain their presence at different party meetings. This group 
of people is « swinging » and characterised by clientelistic tendencies, as discussed in the next 
section. 
7.3. Opportunism and clientelism
Despite their apparent acquaintance with the concept of a democratic vote (per-
forming one’s civic duty, the basic right to elect one’s leaders freely), the Burundian people fre-
quently fall victim to manipulative tactics, such as (financial) coercion, threats, clientelism, etc.
«Some politicians threatened the population by telling them that they would get into trouble if  
they did not vote for them »28
In August 2010, just under half of the people interviewed (43%) testified that it was 
common practice to get paid for raising voter awareness about a particular political party, even 
if one is not a member oneself (table 6). This is the case for 54% of the undecided voters. One 
person in five thinks it is perfectly normal to get paid/receive promises in exchange for affiliation 
with a party. Compulsory membership of a youth movement of a particular party is considered 
normal by one in three of the undecided voters (14%): 18% of the youngsters and 26% of the 
voters for the party in power. Nearly 5% of the population considers it normal to be threatened 
with all kinds of exclusions (health, school, …) if one does not commit oneself to a political party, 
and/or to be under an obligation to vote for a party.
Various elements indicate that how the electoral results are dealt with is far from 
evident, that the democratic process is not completely safeguarded and integrated: 13% of the 
population does not wholeheartedly agree with the idea that those who have won the elections 
should respect the population and the law. Among the group of undecided voters, 22% do not 
affirm this point very clearly. 16% of the population do not exclude the idea of taking revenge if 
their party loses elections. One in three perceives those who lost the election as « dangerous » 
people. Among the CNDD-FDD voters, 42% seem to think so. This result is not surprising: since 
the withdrawal of the opposition parties from the election process, rumours abounded over the 
departure of certain opposition party leaders into the bush as well as over the formation of new 
[28]  « Certains politiciens menaçaient la population en leur disant que si elle ne votait pas pour eux, elle aurait des 
problèmes dans l’avenir » NDI, Focus Group, men, Province of Gitega, Rweza, 24/09/2010.
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rebel groups29.
These results also show a certain despair of the population, who feel that they « are 
willing to do anything a politician would ask them if he promises to pull them out of their diffi-
cult situation, their poverty ». Generally speaking, one in five does not exclude such submission 
and, among undecided voters, 37% do not exclude this type of submission to escape misery. If 
we extrapolate to all Burundian voters, this amounts to 270.000 people. Equally, one fifth of the 
population overtly admits to voting for clientelistic reasons: « I vote for a person because he has 
promised me a job». Among the undecided voters, 41% confirm this. 36% even admit to voting 
for someone who gave them money or paid them a beer. This group represents approximately 
270.000 Burundians. These figures show a potential danger in case of mobilisation by armed 
forces.
With respect to these results, a large  section of the undecided voters seems to 
be a group of « opportunists » susceptible to illicit strategies used by political parties, such as 
intimidation, corruption through clientelism, fraud (Collier and Vincent, 2010). The politicians 
who seek to expand their electorate can focus on the undecided voters as a public to intimidate 
and manipulate. Especially within institutionally weak contexts, politicians use substantial re-
sources to achieve their aims among these undecided voters (Robinson and Torvik, 2009).
These results clearly reveal a gap between the positive representation of what the 
great majority of Burundian voters regards as a democratic vote (use the right to elect its leaders 
freely) and real practices. The latter are totally contradictory to a democratic process. The popu-
lation is often lured by political parties on campaign and, due to its feeble economic situation, 
forced to accept the buying of votes. Indeed, it seems that a large segment of these voters have 
clientelistic tendencies characterizing their political thinking and pratices. 
«The people do not choose by merit, but by who pays them drinks»30
These results confirm to a certain extent the idea that clientelism and the buying of 
votes are relatively common practice in African elections (Wantchekon, 2003; Collier et Vicente, 
2010). And that  for politicians, the election periods are moments when they engage in the ma-
nipulation and mobilisation of the masses. Campaign strategies often take the form of political 
intimidation and material incitement (Bratton, 2008).
[29]  @rib News, 20/08/2010 – Source APA, Rumours of a rebellious army abound in Burundi.
[30]  « Le peuple n’élit pas selon les mérites, il privilégie plutôt ceux qui leur donnent à boire »  NDI, Focus Group, 
men, province of Bururi, Tora, 25/09/2010.
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8. perCepTIon of The polITICal parTIes’ leVel of ConCern Versus The  
 eleCToraTe’s major ConCerns.
Generally speaking, the gap between the major concerns of the population and 
the perception of the political class being strongly preoccupied with those issues has narrowed 
somewhat in comparison with the pre-election results (March 2010) (graph 5). However, the gap 
still remains rather wide. For a majority of issues, the population’s level of strong concern is al-
ways higher than the perceived level of strong concern of the political class. This may indicate a 
rift between two different worlds. This rift, however, is less deep than it was at the beginning of 
the election process. This is not true for the domains of health, education, and the reintegration 
of former soldiers. In this regard, we should note that health and education were two important 
campaign themes of the incumbent party. During his 2005-2010 term in office, the President of 
the Republic, Pierre Nkurunziza, took some very popular measures, such as free education and 
healthcare for children under the age of five and for pregnant women. His presidential campaign 
strongly focused on these measures.
«He supported women giving birth, today it is free, he gave notebooks to schoolchildren, money is used for buying flour 
and the children return to school after their meal ».31
In the economic field (the price of products and access to employment), the gap 
between strong personal concerns and the perception of a strong involvement of political par-
ties remains very wide although these concerns are shared by 89 and 83% of the population. This 
may indicate that the political power is unable to propose something credible in this domain. 
The same observation is made regarding the access to fertiliser, a concern of 65% of the popula-
tion, whereas less than 50% of the interviewed people feel that at least one political party con-
cerns itself with this problem. By contrast, in the field of governmental management, public ser-
vices (access to health, education and drinking water), the gap hardly exists. This illustrates the 
presence of a discourse upheld by political parties that expresses their involvement with state 
responsibilities in the field of health, education and drinking water… However, with respect to 
the effectiveness of justice, the gap stood at 17% in August 2010, while it was 15% in March 2010.
[31]  « Il a aidé les femmes qui accouchent, maintenant c’est gratuit, il a donné des cahiers aux élèves, l’argent sert 
à acheter de la farine et les enfants retournent à l’école après avoir mangé ».NDI, Focus Group, women, province of 
Gitega, Mutoyi, 23/09/2010.
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Graph 5: The population’s personal concerns and perceptions of the degree of involvement 
of political parties.
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Furthermore, there is a 27% gap concerning the fight against corruption. Apparently, 
as during the pre-election period in March, the political class has very low credibility regarding 
this issue in August 2010, although it is a very strong concern among the population (87%), only 
60% of which perceives a real commitment of political parties to resolve this issue.
« I dare say that corruption has become a vital part of Burundian culture. In the minds of the people, corruption has 
become a law. »32
« Corruption is everywhere. »33
Finally, concerning the security linked to disarmament, the gap between strong 
personal concerns and the political parties’ perceived involvement is much narrower; as for the 
reintegration of former soldiers, there is no gap at all. This indicates a certain confidence of the 
population in the political class regarding its handling of problems in the peace process. While 
the 2005 elections placed great stock on peace and security - « the elections will bring peace », 
« a good statesman seeks to establish peace » (Nimubona, 2005) - it seems that this peace, 
which was achieved and preserved by Pierre Nkurunziza, was no longer the prime concern for 
the Burundian voter in 2010. By contrast, with respect to land problems and access to land, 
especially as it concerns local families, and, to a lesser extent, repatriates, political parties did 
not succeed in convincing the population that they concerned themselves with these issues.
8.1. Differences across regions and « groups of voters » 
With respect to land issues, especially since they involve local families (population 
increase), repatriates and the access to land, the electorate of Bujumbura Mairie is obviously 
less preoccupied with these issues than people living in CNDD-FDD-oriented provinces and, to 
a lesser extent, people living in provinces with a stronger disparity between communal election 
results, i.e. Bururi and Bujumbura (table 7). This indicates that these issues pertain to a rural 
context.
With respect to other groups of voters, the voters belonging to the voting group of 
the incumbent party are mostly preoccupied with primary needs (table 8). There are no signifi-
cant variations across groups of voters for land issues involving repatriates and local families. 
The issues that concern CNDD-FDD voters more than the opposition group are access to land 
and chemical/organic fertiliser. This indicates that the electorate of the opposition is less preoc-
cupied with the issues that directly concern the incumbent power. Moreover, it indicates that 
the electorate of the party in power is more preoccupied with issues relating to a rural context, 
i.e. the peasantry. 
[32]  « Je dirais que la corruption est devenue comme de la culture au Burundi. Dans la conscience des hommes, 
la corruption est devenue comme une loi. » NDI, Focus Group, men, province of Bujumbura Mairie, Kamenge, 
25/09/2010.
[33]  « Partout c’est la corruption».NDI, Focus Group, men, province of Bujumbura Mairie, Kamenge, 25/09/2010.
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Table 7: Preoccupations of the electorate (regional)
In the fields of security, corruption and unemployment/access to employment, 
which are the strongest preoccupations for the CNDD-FDD voters (even though their level of 
concern is lower than that of the opposition voters), we do not observe any disparity between 
their level of concern and their perception of their political party’s level of concern. For exam-
ple, 60% of the CNDD-FDD voters are concerned with corruption, and 60% of them reckon that 
CNDD-FDD is greatly concerned with this issue. Moreover, the CNDD-FDD electorate is much 
less preoccupied with the issue of effectiveness of justice than other groups of voters.
Préoccupations Bujumbura Mairie
Bururi.  
Bujumbura
Provinces 
CNDD-FDD 
très fort
The rest of 
the provinces
Security The disarmament of civil population to 
avoid crime and banditism (theft etc.)
71% 65% 61% 61%
Violence perpetrated by certain mem-
bers of the security forces (police and 
the army)
52% 38% 42% 40%
The reintegration of former soldiers 25% 23% 28% 26%
Corruption Corruption 67% 60% 60% 59%
The Economy Unemployment and access to  
employment
53% 49% 51% 49%
The increase in basic merchandise 
(beans, flour, sugar, rice, fuel, beer)
64% 63% 62% 59%
Government 
Responsibili-
ties
Access to drinking water 39% 57% 57% 56%
Access to health 38% 39% 36% 37%
Access to education 32% 34% 29% 32%
The effectiveness of justice (detention, 
preventive measures, time taken up by 
procedures)
52% 45% 41% 45%
Land Land problems for repatriates 14% 23% 30% 26%
Access to land 24% 27% 36% 31%
Access to chemical and organic fertiliser 20% 30% 36% 31%
Land problems concerning local  
families (population increase)
22% 27% 36% 32%
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Table 8: Concerns of the electorate by « voter groups »
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With regard to state functioning, the delivery of public services such as access to 
health or education, which were actually two key themes in the CNDD-FDD campaigns, the 
group of CNDD-FDD voters is less preoccupied with these issues than the opposition voters. 
This could mean  that voters for the party in power tend not to vote for a political programme 
but rather vote by way of adherence to the party. Such a populist adherence might be influ-
enced by five years marked by many trips of the president to the country’s interior. Since his 
accession, Pierre Nkurunziza, more than any other president before him, has been visiting the 
“communes” (municipalities) in the country to participate in various development projects and 
in the construction of social infrastructure. He created a political proximity with rural popula-
tions on social issues in doing so (ICG, 2011). 
This rural population, which constitutes CNDD-FDD’s electoral base, is poor but 
also important from a demographic point of view (89% of the population); it is primarily con-
cerned with basic needs (security, access to land, health, education etc.) and less concerned 
with governmental problems and impunity, which mostly concern the intellectual elites (ICG, 
2011)
In a general way, the opposition voters are more preoccupied with what directly 
affects public governance (justice, corruption…). More than 80% of the opposition elector-
ate is preoccupied with corruption while this preoccupation degree stands only at 60% among 
other electorates. The corruption issue is thus of greater concern  to the electorate that wants 
to see a change in political personnel. In this respect, there is no disparity between the opposi-
tion voters’ level of concern and their perception of their own political party’s level of concern. 
They feel that their preoccupation with this issue is shared by their political party.
Nearly 70% of the voting group  “opposition” is concerned about the effective-
ness of justice, while only 45% of the CNDD-FDD voters and 47% of the undecided voters are 
concerned about this. Justice is the prerogative of the state. In Burundi too, as in other post-
conflict countries, we see that those in power have a strong grip on justice (RCN, 2011). The fact 
that the opposition voters are so heavily preoccupied with the issue of effective justice ties in 
with their rejection of the party in power as a whole. Generally speaking, these figures confirm 
the findings of two other studies that showed little confidence among the population in  the 
judicial system (RCN, 2009; RCN, 2011).
This group of voters is also more preoccupied with economic issues such as the 
increase in prices of basic goods and the access to employment. More than 70% of this elector-
ate is strongly preoccupied with economic issues and seems to be satisfied with the way its 
political party is handling the economy.
The opposition voters are far more concerned about security issues (disarmament 
of the civil population, denouncing violent acts perpetrated by certain members of law and 
order) than the other voters. More than 80% of them are concerned about the disarmament of 
the civil population, and more than one in three is concerned about the reintegration of former 
soldiers. This could be explained by the fact that this group of voters is partly composed of for-
mer combatants of the rebel movement, the FNL Palipehutu. Among the group of opposition 
voters, we see a disparity between their level of concern about disarming the civil population 
and their perception of the ADC-Ikibiri coalition parties’ level of concern. While 83% of the 
opposition voters claim to be concerned about this issue, only 56% feel that a party within the 
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ADC-Ikibiri is strongly focussed on this problem. 
Whereas access to education and health are two key themes in the CNDD-FDD 
campaign, the opposition voters turn out to be more preoccupied with these two themes (49% 
and 50% respectively) than the CNDD-FDD voters (34% and 39% respectively). This could in-
dicate lower satisfaction with the measures taken during the previous presidential term. For 
the CNDD-FDD voters, the perception of their political party’s level of concern about access to 
education and health stands at 85% and 80% respectively.
The opposition electorate’s different levels of concern about these topics (table 8) 
in comparison with other electorates could be partly explained by the fact that the opposition 
voters constitute rather an elite group, which is of a higher socio-economic level than the aver-
age population. They therefore have better access to the media, who communicate information 
and different points of view about various topics. This led them to be preoccupied with issues 
other than primary needs. « People concerned about filling their stomachs cannot be preoccu-
pied with more abstract issues »34 -  (A. Mbembe, 1988).
The undecided voters are less preoccupied with these different issues than the vot-
ers of the party in power or the opposition voters, especially in terms of security; only half of this 
voter group is concerned about security issues. Moreover, there is no disparity between their 
personal level of concern and their perception of their political party’s level of concern.
Even if this group of voters is less preoccupied with the problem of corruption, we 
should note that there is nevertheless a disparity between their level of concern about this is-
sue and their perception of their political parties’ level of concern. While 57% of the undecided 
voters claim to be concerned about this issue, only 48% feel that there is a political class that 
is strongly focussed on the issue. This lack of confidence in the political establishment is also 
reflected in issues related to the economy. The undecided voters do not perceive sufficient com-
mitment of political parties in this field, even though nearly half of themare concerned about 
this subject. Nevertheless, the level of concern of these voters in this field is  far less important 
than that of other groups of voters.
Generally speaking: the group of voters that is not very committed (the “immo-
bilie” voting group) is always less preoccupied with different issues than other groups of vot-
ers. We see this as a sign of this group’s low commitment  to societal issues. However, this 
group does remain concerned about issues such as price increases (64%), disarmament (62%) 
and corruption (57%). Furthermore, these voters do not feel that the political class focusses on 
these problems. This illustrates a feeling of disappointment with the political class and a pos-
sible loss of confidence.
Both CNDD-FDD voters and opposition voters often reckon that their political par-
ty is greatly focussed on their concerns, and thus the concerns of the population. The undecided 
voters seldom think so and the ”immobile” voters even less so. Therefore, the CNDD-FDD and 
opposition voters often find that the party whose meetings they attended really cares about 
these issues. This has more to do with belief: these individuals do not tend to stand back and 
take stock, they do not question the messages they hear at political meetings, but simply ac-
cept them as truths. Their attitude towards the political scene is one of adhesion.
[34]  « Les personnes préoccupées par le ventre ne savent pas être préoccupées par des questions abstraites »
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9. ConClusIon
According to the survey  results, the communal elections have been regarded, in 
the mindset of the Burundian voters, as a first round of the presidential elections. During these 
communal elections, the electorate has largely voted for the national political party and its em-
blematic leader rather than for local candidates or local development programmes.
Generally speaking, for the whole of Burundi, the analysis of political meeting at-
tendance and of the knowledge of national and local personalities confirm a very strong pres-
ence of CNDD-FDD, especially in rural areas. However, on the basis of the communal election 
results of 24th May 2010 and an analysis of political meeting attendance, we could distinguish 
two regional trends in the dynamic process of political mobilisation: a single-party trend in one 
region and a plurality trend in another. Attendance at political party meetings in Bujumbura 
Mairie, Bujumbura and Bururi show a diverse picture, while in the other provinces political mo-
bilisation (participation in meetings and voter practices) shows a single-party trend: people in 
these provinces tend to vote for the incumbent CNDD-FDD party. 
The average participation rate in the communal elections was very high but de-
creased considerably – although still remaining high compared to elections in other countries 
– during the presidential and legislative elections. This can be explained by the boycott of the 
election process by some opposition parties. The participation rate in all elections remained 
high among those who exclusively attended CNDD-FDD meetings. Consequently, we can infer 
that the participation rate was markedly lower among people who exclusively attended a meet-
ing of a party of the opposition coalition, ADC-IKIBIRI.
An analysis of the survey results suggest that a distinction can be made between 
four voter groups in Burundi (in 2010). The « CNDD-FDD voters », representing 17% of the pop-
ulation of voting age, reflect a rural population; this group mostly includes peasants, cattle 
breeders and civil servants. Six percent of the population of voting age can be considered « op-
position voters ». They mostly belong to a higher socio-economic category and tend to live 
in the capital and the province of Bujumbura. The group of « undecided voters » represents 
approximately 18% of the population of voting age. This group includes mostly youngsters (be-
tween 18 and 25) with low levels of formal education. The group of « immobile voters » is larger, 
with 51% of the population of voting age; these voters tend to be elderly people with little or no 
schooling. They are often peasants and catlle breeders.
Generally speaking, within these groups of voters, the « generic » motivation dom-
inates: voting is a civic duty linked to carrying out a basic right, the right to choose one’s leaders 
etc. In addition, one can conclude that the CNDD-FDD voters sought to consolidate the power 
in place with their vote, while the opposition voters wanted change. A finding that is to a certain 
extent evident, of course. This conclusion is also confirmed by the analysis of the political par-
ties’ perceived level of concern regarding the electorate’s concerns. We pointed out that these 
results suggest that the voters of the incumbent party tend to vote by way of populist adhesion 
rather than for a particular political programme.
For all political parties, we observe a general disparity between two different 
worlds: the political class does not seem to respond to the preoccupations of the population. 
This observation is reinforced by a large part of the “immobile” voters, who express a feeling 
of lost confidence and disappointment regarding the political class. Moreover, a large group of 
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voters, especially among the undecided electorate, seems susceptible to clientelist practices.
These results clearly show a rift.  On the one hand there is the positive image that 
the majority of the Burundian population has of the democratic voting process: it gives them the 
right to choose their leaders freely. On the other hand, there is the the pragmatism that inspires 
them and that makes them receptive to clientelist practices. In addition, there is an alienation 
from the goal of the country’s democratisation discernable in their actual thoughts and prac-
tices. Not only is this lack of political maturity observed at micro level and in the mindset of the 
voters, it also plays a role at macro level when politicians « jeopardize the rules of democracy » 
(Palmans 2011). We could even doubt  whether in such a situation maturity in the democratic 
process could actually develop at the local level, in the practices and minds of voters.
If one tries to make a link with the nature of the political transition in Burundi, two 
questions arise. First, if this political transition shows a democratic trend, the challenge will 
be to create links between political parties and voters for a shared vision of society and a joint 
development project. If, by contrast, the trend is one towards authoritarian autocracy, chances 
are that the voters’ indifference and their populist or clientelist motivations will be exploited to 
suit anti-democratic goals and violent strategies.
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